Russon, Begun, and the other distinguished contributors to this volume take on one of the most vexing and intriguing questions in science today, namely, the origins and functions of intelligence in great apes and humans. The volume begins and ends with insightful summaries and reviews of what is currently understood about the cognitive abilities of great apes, the likely traits of the last common ancestor of extant great apes and humans, and the climatic, ecological, and social selection pressures that may have contributed to the evolution of these traits. The integrative reviews are complemented by three sets of chapters written by leading experts in biological anthropology, paleontology, and primatology, which, in total, provide a thorough and fascinating analysis of cognition (Part 1) and other adaptations (Part 2) in living great apes, as well as inferred adaptations in ancestral apes based on the fossil record (Part 3). This is not a work for the casual reader, but it is an important contribution and a must read for serious scholars with an interest in the evolution of the mind.
considerably more varied and flexible, requiring some degree of anticipation and planning. This is a useful distinction, as is Parker's proposal that development involves a social apprenticeship whereby the scripts for some of the more complex features of social life are elaborated upon, with the aid of older group members, during the juvenile period. This first section is rounded off by Blake's analysis of gestural communication in great apes and by Russon's review of their cognition compared with that of human preschoolers. Both chapters provide useful, thoughtful synopses of their respective content areas.
The second section is composed of five chapters that address more specific adaptations. MacLeod begins with a good review of the state of knowledge on size, hemispheric asymmetry, and specific anatomical features in great ape brains. When all is said and done, size does matter: Due to allometric changes associated with brain expansion, larger brains will have greater modularity (i.e., interconnections among a finite set of neurons) within wider brain areas and greater connectivity within and across these areas (Kaas, 2000) . The result is abilities to process more subtle variation in social (e.g., facial expression) and ecological information patterns and to better integrate information across domains. There are also species differences in brain organization (Semendeferi, Armstrong, Schleicher, Zilles, & van Hoesen, 2001) . At this point, the relative contributions of brain size and organization to great ape and human cognitive abilities are not yet fully understood, but changes in both are implicated in the evolution of these abilities. In the next chapter, Ross reminds us of the importance of considering brain and cognitive evolution in the context of life history. Brain size, body size, length of the developmental period, and social and reproductive dynamics are all intercorrelated, and thus, separating cause-and-effect, coevolutionary, and simple allometric relationships is difficult, to say the least. Although no firm conclusions can yet be drawn, it is clear that the length of the developmental period has expanded in great apes relative to monkeys and expanded further with the emergence of humans, patterns that need to be incorporated into any model of the evolution of ape and human minds ).
Yamakoshi's thorough review of the use of tools and substrates to secure food in natural settings and in various species of monkey and great ape nicely complements Byrne's contribution. An example of the former is the use of sticks by some groups of chimpanzees to bfishQ for termites, whereas an example of the latter is the macaques' (Macaca) occasional use of water to clean food items. Of the monkeys, substrate and tool use is most common in capuchins (Cebus) but largely involves stereotyped banging of hard foods, such as nuts, on substrates (e.g., a tree trunk). The most flexible and sophisticated use of tool and substrate is found in the chimpanzee, although there have also been some similar observations in the orangutan (Pongo pygmaeus). Hunt's chapter provides a review of arboreal locomotion in great apes, with reference to the hypothesis of Povinelli and Cant (1995) that the challenge of movement by large-bodied species in this ecology results in a selective advantage for the ability to represent the self in terms of posture and locomotion when planning movements. The reviewed data are largely inconsistent with the hypothesis, except perhaps for the orangutan. Chapters by van Schaik et al. and by Yamagiwa close this section with a discussion of the relation between ecology (food and predators) and great ape social systems. Of particular importance is the reduced predation risk associated with large body size, which, in turn, enables a more flexible fission-fusion social organization than in monkeys, as is also discussed in the chapters by Parker and Ward et al. Reduced predation and increased flexibility in social organization are correlates of the life history pattern described by Ross Table 1 Proposed definitions of intelligence, memory, and related terms Intelligence Fluid intelligence: The use of working memory, planning, and reasoning abilities to devise behavioral strategies to cope with novel social or ecological conditions. Crystallized intelligence: Long-term semantic, procedural, episodic, and other memories that have been experientially acquired during the life span, or result from the pattern of inherent brain organization associated with the species' evolutionary history.
Long-term memory
Semantic: General factual knowledge that can be language based (e.g., Darwin is . . .) or visual-spatial (e.g., knowledge of the location of one object vis-à-vis another object). Procedural: Either learned or evolved stereotyped sequences of behaviors that are typically used in specific contexts. Episodic: Autobiographic representations of personal experiences and personally perceived events.
Heuristic
Goal directed but stereotypical sequence of behaviors that are automatically and implicitly (without conscious awareness) executed in specific social or ecological contexts. These can be evolved or learned, and their expression can be inhibited in some species.
Working memory
Central executive: An attention-driven system that appears to amplify implicit representations of information represented in long-term memory, generated by current social or ecological conditions, or some combination thereof. It also includes mechanisms that can inhibit the execution of heuristics or behavioral actions. Phonological loop: Explicit, auditory-based representation of phonemes and other language-based sounds; conspecific sounds in nonhuman species. Visual-spatial sketch pad: Explicit, visual (e.g., facial expression), or spatial (e.g., relative location)
representations. Episodic buffer: Integration of phonological, visual, and spatial information into an explicit and integrated representation of a personal event or experience.
Content representation
Folk psychology: Implicit or explicit knowledge organized around the self, individual conspecifics, or groups of conspecifics. Folk biology: Implicit or explicit knowledge organized around species of flora or fauna that are potential predators or serve as sources of food. Folk physics: Implicit or explicit knowledge organized around the three-dimensional structure of physical space and variation of terrain features within this space, as well as knowledge of how to use objects or substrate for food extraction.
Planning and reasoning
The mental representation of the current state and the desired end state in working memory. Planning involves the mental simulation of potential behavioral moves that will reduce the difference between the current and desired state. Reasoning encompasses the rules on how behaviors can be systematically sequenced to achieve the goal.
and, in combination, appear to have reduced the need for highly scripted social exchanges and thus opened the door for the evolution of nonstereotyped social-competitive competencies.
The final section consists of six very useful chapters on the climatic (Potts) and ecological (Singleton, Gebo) conditions that were probably experienced by Miocene apes, along with reviews of evidence regarding the brain (Begun and Kordos) and life history (Kelly) evolution of these species. Ward and colleagues conclude the section with a review of the model of Alexander (1989) of the evolution of ecological dominance in hominids and the resultant ramping up of social competition for control of ecological resources (see also Flinn, Geary, & Ward, 2005) . Although there is no consensus on the relative roles of these selection pressures in the evolution of great ape cognition, there is agreement that our Miocene ancestors were large-bodied, large-brained, fruit-eating apes with a comparatively long developmental period and, perhaps, a flexible fission-fusion social structure. In addition, it appears that the basic pattern of larger brains and slower development that distinguishes modern apes from modern monkeys was probably evident in at least some Miocene apes. These species were subjected to changing climatic and other ecological conditions, and possibly an increasing degree of fluidity of social relationships and group organization.
All told, this book provides a state of the art review of the social, ecological, and climatic pressures experienced by extant great apes and their ancestors and insightful discussions of attendant brain, cognitive, and life history adaptations. This is an important contribution and a must read for anthropologists, biologists, primatologists, and psychologists with an interest in mind and its evolution. The only real drawback is the inconsistent use of core terms such as bintelligence,Q bplanning,Q bcognition,Q brepresentation,Q bsymbols,Q bmemory,Q and so forth across the chapters. This is not a criticism of the editors or authors per se, but rather a reflection of the state of the field. When psychologists use the term intelligence, I suspect that they are usually referring to something different than when anthropologists or paleontologists use the same term. In an attempt to reduce the confusion (or perhaps add to it), I provide some definitions and guidelines in Table 1 . I am of course biased in my definitions, being a cognitive psychologist, but these may nonetheless provide a starting point for future clarifications and eventual uniformity in the use of terms and definitions across disciplines. To start, bcognitionQ is the most general class that encompasses all of the more specific competencies described in Table 1 .
The term intelligence has a long history in psychology (Spearman, 1904) , referring to two distinct but equally important competencies: fluid intelligence and crystallized intelligence (Cattell, 1963) . Long-term memory has been studied by experimental psychologists for more than 100 years and multiple forms have been identified (e.g., Schacter & Tulving, 1994; Tulving, 1983) . These forms of long-term memory are typically considered to be implicitly represented (i.e., outside conscious awareness), but the output of the associated neural processes (although not the processes themselves) can often become explicitly represented in working memory and thus available to conscious awareness. Even without explicit awareness, these memories can affect behavior. Many of the stereotypical aspects of primate behavior, such as those involved in the social interactions of Hamadryas baboons (Parker) or substrate use by capuchin monkeys (Yamakoshi), are likely based on procedural memory and heuristics (see Gigerenzer, Todd, & ABC Research Group, 1999) that are executed without conscious planning.
Working memory has been the focus of intense study for the past three decades, since the seminal contributions of Baddeley and Hitch (1974) , and is believed to be composed of four systems: an attention-driven bcentral executiveQ and three passive systems (see Table 1 ). Of the passive systems, much of the work of cognitive psychologists has been focused on the phonological loop and visual-spatial sketch pad (e.g., Baddeley & Logie, 1999) . Geary (2005) suggested that this was, in part, due to cognitive psychologists' understandable focus on vision (given that we are diurnal primates) and on linguistic communication. The point is that passive systems may also be found for olfactory, somatosensory, and gustatory information, depending on the species.
Recent work on the episodic buffer and memory system is crucial to our understanding of evolutionary changes in ape and human cognition. This is because episodic memory and the conscious representation of memories in the episodic buffer appear to support self-awareness and the ability to btime travelQ mentally (Tulving, 2002) , an essential component of any evolutionary model that involves planning and projecting the self into potential future conditions, whether the task be arboreal locomotion, as in the hypothesis of Povinelli and Cant (1995) , or fluid social relations, as described in various chapters of the book at hand (e.g., Parker, Ward et al.) .
The central executive is also of critical importance because it refers to the brain systems that provide the btop downQ control of attention and the manipulation of information represented in the passive systems. For instance, a spoken utterance will be automatically and passively represented in the phonological loop as a string of meaning-based sounds, and this information will decay unless it is rehearsed; the central executive controls the execution of the rehearsal. The central executive component of working memory is of particular relevance to many of the issues addressed in the book under review, because the attentional processes and underlying prefrontal brain systems, and the corresponding ability to explicitly represent and manipulate information (e.g., a spoken utterance, a sense of self) in working memory, are at the core of a general fluid intelligence and the core of the planning needed to cope with novelty and variability of social or ecological conditions (Geary, 2005; Kane & Engle, 2002) .
Representation can have many meanings, from the pattern of synaptic/neural changes that occur during associative learning to an explicit conscious awareness of features of the self. With respect to primate cognition and its evolution, it might be most useful to define representations in terms of content. Following a taxonomy proposed by Geary (2005) , the content of representation can be placed into three categories that correspond to the areas of folk psychology, biology, and physics. These are inherent biases in attentional, perceptual, and other brain systems that orient the animal toward members of its own (folk psychology) and other species (folk biology), as well as the physical world (folk physics). This folk knowledge appears to result from the prenatal pattern of brain organization, which creates skeletal perceptual and cognitive-representational systems that require a long developmental period, or apprenticeship, as argued by Parker, to adapt to the nuances of the local ecology and social group.
The central executive and working memory comprise the platform for planning, reasoning, and projection of the self into potential future situations, whether these involve changes in position during arboreal movement (Povinelli & Cant, 1995) , coping with climatic change (Potts), or social dynamics (Parker; Ward et al.) . The gist of planning and reasoning is shown at the bottom of Table 1 , and descriptions of the presumed basic mechanisms can be found in any undergraduate textbook on cognition (e.g., Ashcraft, 2002) . These competencies appear to be independent of working memory per se (Embretson, 1995) , but their use is highly dependent on the ability to focus attention on the problem at hand and to generate potential behavioral solutions to this problem in working memory; the central executive is involved in the sequencing of the behavioral steps. The combination of the central executive component of working memory and the ability to use planning and reasoning to devise behavioral strategies to cope with variation in climatic, ecological, or social conditions defines fluid intelligence.
As an illustration of how more precise definitions might be useful in analyzing great ape cognition and its evolution, consider that the social scripts of Hamadryas baboons (Parker) would be categorized as implicit, heuristic-based behaviors in the domain of folk psychology, whereas the capuchin monkeys' use of banging for food retrieval (Yamakoshi) would be categorized as an implicit, heuristic-based behavior in the domain of folk physics. These heuristics likely evolved independently and depend on different brain regions, thus, competency in one domain may tell us little about competency in the other. The fluid social scripts and flexible tool use in great apes, in contrast, may require folk psychological and folk physical systems, respectively, in combination with the more domain-general competencies that define the central executive component of working memory. The engagement of the central executive appears to be required for the conscious representation of folk knowledge in working memory and, although perhaps less essential in this domain, also facilitates the modification of inherent biases for the learning of new heuristics and social behaviors during the life span; potential mechanisms are described elsewhere (Geary, 2005) . In other words, the selection pressures that favored the evolution of the expansion of the capacity of the central executive for use in one domain, such as folk physics, would result in increased flexibility in the use of evolved heuristics in other domains, such as folk psychology. At the same time, the evolution of domain-specific heuristics, such as Hamadryas social scripts, is likely to be a more modularized adaptation that does not get at the heart, so to speak, of fluid intelligence.
I believe the authors in Russon's and Begun's volume are arguing that the core feature of great ape, and especially human, bintelligence,Q is in fact fluid intelligence, and the component competencies of the central executive/working memory and of planning/ reasoning. It is likely that the evolution of fluid intelligence in humans involved many steps and adaptations (e.g., larger body size and reduced predation) since the emergence of Miocene apes, and it is possible that many of the climatic, ecological, and social pressures discussed in this volume contributed to these evolutionary steps, but at different times and to varying degrees. The task then is to determine which great ape adaptations likely required fluid intelligence, as opposed (for instance) to domain-specific heuristics, and the evolutionary sequence of adaptive steps, selection pressures, and content domains (e.g., folk psychology or folk physics) that were of central importance at each step. At the very least, progress in this cross-disciplinary field will require agreement on the definition of key terms and their consistent use across fields.
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